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FDIC Approves Final Rule on
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| Example Rating | Risk-Weight | Capital Required for each $1 of Investment |
| a)Investment Grade: | ||
| AAA or AA* | 20% | 1.6 cents |
| A* | 50% | 4 cents |
| BBB | 100% | 8 cents |
| b)One Category Below: BB |
200% | 16 cents |
| c)B and below, and all Unrated | Not eligible for reduction | 100 cents |
| * IOs and POs, regardless of rating, are not eligible for less than 100%weighting. | ||
Keep in mind that a 200% risk-weight is a lower capital charge than dollar-for-dollar. The capital requirement for a position is computed by multiplying the face amount of the position by the appropriate risk weight determined from the table. Thus, under the new rule, securities receiving the third-highest rating, A, require 4% capital, while those with the lowest investment grade, BBB, require 8%. B-rated or unrated securities require dollar-for-dollar capital.
Only one rating is required if there is a reasonable expectation that in the near future, either (1) the position may be traded; or (2) the position may be used in a secured loan or repo transaction in which a third party relies on the rating. Otherwise, to qualify for the ratings-based approach, the position must be rated by more than one rating agency, the ratings must be the equivalent of BB or better by all rating agencies providing a rating, the ratings must be publicly available, and the ratings must be based on the same criteria used to rate securities that are traded. If the ratings are different, the lowest rating will determine the risk-weight.
In the absence of external ratings, the regulators have decided for the present not to allow banks to use internal ratings, program ratings or computer programs to apply a risk-based capital treatment more favorable than a dollar-for-dollar capital requirement to "residual interests," although such methodology will be allowed for other types of exposures.
If a bank sells a residual interest to a third-party and writes a credit derivative to cover the credit risk associated with that asset, the selling bank must continue to risk weight, and hold capital against, that asset as a residual as if the asset had not been sold. The same holds true if a bank transfers the risk on a residual interest through guarantees or other credit risk mitigation techniques, and then reassumes this risk in any form.
The rule imposes a concentration limit on "credit-enhancing interest-only strips (CEIOs)", whether retained or purchased, to 25% of Tier 1 capital, (Core Capital for Thrifts). For regulatory capital purposes only, any amount of CEIOs that exceeds the 25% limit will be deducted from Tier 1 capital. CEIOs that are not deducted from Tier 1 capital, along with all other residual interests are subject to the dollar-for-dollar requirements, as described above.
Some more definitions are in order:
The following example illustrates the concentration calculation:
A bank has $100 in purchased and retained CEIOs on its balance sheet and Tier 1 capital of $320 (before any disallowed servicing assets, purchased credit card relationships and deferred tax assets). The bank would multiply the Tier 1 capital of $320 by 25%, which is $80. The amount of CEIOs that exceed the concentration limit, in this case, $20, is deducted from Tier 1 capital. The remaining $80 is then subject to the dollar-for-dollar capital charge. The $20 deducted from Tier 1 capital, plus the $80 in total risk-based capital required, equals $100, the balance sheet amount of the CEIOs. Banks may apply a net-of-tax approach on any CEIOs that have been disallowed from Tier 1, as well as to the remaining residual interests subject to the risk-based-capital rule.
When a securitization is accounted for as a financing, no gain is recognized or capital created from an accounting standpoint, which serves to mitigate some of the regulators' concerns. The agencies, however, have said that they will monitor securitization transactions that are accounted for as financings and will factor into the bank's capital adequacy determination the risk exposures being assumed or retained in connection with the transaction.
The agencies retain the authority to exercise discretion to ensure that banks, as they develop novel financial assets, will be treated appropriately under the regulatory capital standards. Accordingly, they have the right to assign risk positions in securitizations to appropriate risk categories on a case-by-case basis if the credit rating of the risk position is determined to be inappropriate.
The agencies have had longstanding concerns that a bank may implicitly undertake a credit-enhancing position by exercising a clean-up call option when the credit quality of the securitized loans is deteriorating. An excessively large clean-up call facilitates a securitization servicer's ability to take investors out of a pool to protect them from absorbing credit losses and, thus, may indicate that the servicer has retained or assumed the credit risk on the underlying pool of loans.
Under the final rule, an agreement that permits a bank that is a servicer or an affiliate of the servicer to elect to purchase loans in a pool is not recourse or a direct credit substitute if the agreement permits the bank to purchase the remaining loans in a pool when the balance of those loans is equal to or less than 10% of the original pool balance. {Query: could the 10% relate to the outstanding balance of the bonds, rather than the collateral, as some optional termination provisions are written?}. However, an agreement that permits the remaining loans to be repurchased when their balance is greater than 10% of the original pool balance is considered to be recourse or a direct credit substitute. {Query: could one argue that the portion considered to be recourse should be limited to the excess over 10%?}
Further, to minimize the potential for using such a feature as a means of providing support for a troubled portfolio, the agencies say that a bank that exercises a call should not repurchase any loans in the pool that are 30 days or more past due. Alternatively, the bank should repurchase the loans at the lower of their estimated fair value or their par value plus accrued interest. Regardless of the size of the clean-up call, the agencies will closely scrutinize any transaction where the banking organization repurchases deteriorating assets for an amount greater than a reasonable estimate of their fair value and will take action accordingly. {Query: would their concerns be mitigated when the bank holds the first-loss position and has provided dollar-for-dollar capital.}
Cash advances made by residential mortgage loan servicers to ensure an uninterrupted flow of payments to investors are specifically excluded from the definition of recourse, provided that the residential mortgage loan servicer is entitled to reimbursement for any significant advances and this reimbursement is not subordinate to other claims. The bank, as servicer, is expected to make an independent credit assessment of the likelihood of repayment of the servicer advance, before deciding to advance and should only make such an advance if prudent lending standards are met. {Query: what about asset types other than residential mortgage loans?}
Some large, sophisticated banks (but not thrifts) are allowed to apply the "market risk rules." For banks that comply with the market risk rules, positions in the trading book arising from securitizations, should be treated for risk-based capital purposes in accordance with those rules. However, they are still subject to the 25% concentration limit for CEIOs.
The rule requires that the fair value of servicing assets, purchased credit card relationships and CEIOs be updated at least quarterly and include adjustments for any significant changes in assumptions. The FDIC may require independent fair value estimates where they deem it appropriate.
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