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RMBS guidelines of the
Reserve Bank of India
by Vinod
Kothari
The RBI has issued capital guidelines for banks that would invest in
RMBS paper, and in the process has virtually laid down guidelines for
RMBS applicable in the country. The sequence of the guidelines goes as
under:
- The RBI's letter dated 24th May permits a 50% risk weight for investment
by banks into RMBS paper.
- It also permits 50% risk weight for any loans backed by residential
property.
- As precondition for the 50% risk weight, RMBS must comply with certain
conditions.
- Since banks are the biggest buyers of RMBS paper in the country,
obvious enough, these guidelines become the preconditions for any
RMBS paper to be sellable to banks.
From a reading of the conditions it is pretty clear that these conditions
are appropriate to grant capital relief to the originator, rather than
to allow capital relief to the investor. It is strange that such conditions
should have been prescribed from the investors' viewpoint. The use of
"cut-paste" technology is obvious - as the guidelines have
mistakingly used the word "bank" for HFC!
The main requirements of the guidelines are discussed below:
- The 50% risk weight is applicable to RMBS only and not to CMBS.
- The loans and receivables being securitised must "irrevocably"
be assigned in favour of an SPV. There are two things being said
here - one, that any securitisation without an SPV does not qualify
as RMBS - for example, a direct sale of a bunch of loans to the
investing bank. Two, the transfer must be by way of irrevocable
assignment. This takes care of the dubious practice being followed
by some players of making a "revocable" transfer to achieve
certain tax consequences.
- The underlying mortgages should also be transferred and held by
the SPV. [Para 3 (b)] This might often seem to be a difficult proposition
as (a) the mortgage might, in most cases, be an equitable mortgage
itself; and (b) the transfer of the mortgage might be a logistically
difficult scene. It should have been better if the present practice
of holding the mortgages with the originator as trustee for the
SPV would have been allowed.
- From para 3 (c), a possible meaning that might emerge is that
the RMBS should necessarily be a pass through and should reflect
the same pay-back as the underlying mortgages. This would be least
desirable. As the market grows, pay through should be the norm,
as it is globally.
- Originator must not hold any equity or preference capital in the
SPV, or be its beneficiary.
- The SPV's name should not reflect association with the originator.
- The originator must either not have any director on the board
of the SPV, or where the SPV has at least 3 directors, the originator
can have a minority.
- The originator should not directly or indirectly control the SPV.
- The originator should not support the losses in the securitization
transaction or bear the expenses of the SPV.
- Para 3 (e) is strange - it reads: "The loans to be securitised
should be accorded an investment grade credit rating by any of the
credit rating agencies at the time of assignment to the SPV."
It is difficult to see how the loans being securitised can be rated
at all. Rating agencies do lay down selection criteria, but that
cannot be said to lead to an investment grade rating for the loans.
- One of the passing statements in the last para talks about "irrevocable
transfer of risks and rewards". This is out of the world. There
is a transfer of risk and rewards, but never an absolute transfer
of all risks and rewards in any securitization transaction.
As we have commented before, these guidelines, and such guidelines
all over the world, are laid down from viewpoint of capital relief
for the originator. However, from an investor viewpoint, it should
be enough to ensure that the securities are backed by residential
mortgages, to be treated at par with lending against a mortgage. There
are so many conditions above for which an investor will have no means
to satisfy himself except to rely on opinions. For example, whether
there has been a transfer of risks or rewards, or whether the originator
controls the SPV or not, is not of much concern to the investor, neither
does the investor have any means to verify the same.
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